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Mimicking the US in 1980 and 1990s, Brazil is a remarkable case of a major 
shift  in  homicides.  After  increasing  steadily  throughout  the  1990s  and  the 
beginning of the 2000s, homicides reached a peak in 2003, and then fell. I 
show  a  strong  time-series  co-movement  between  homicide  rates  and  the 
percentage of the population in 15-24 age bracket. Using a panel of states, I 
find a very high elasticity of homicide with respect to changes in the 15-24 
year-old population (2.4), after controlling for income, income inequality, and 
state and year fixed effects. I then focus on the case of São Paulo, the largest 
state in the country, and whose shift in homicides has been particularly acute. 
City-level  panel  elasticities  are  similar  to  the  state-level  estimates. 
Furthermore, the demographic shift in São Paulo was more pronounced than 
the national one, explaining the particularly large shift in homicides in São 
Paulo. The large cohort born from the mid 1970 through the early 1980 is the 
result  of  a  sharp  reduction  in  infant  mortality  only  belatedly  followed  by 
acceleration in the reduction of fertility. In line with the Easterlin Hypothesis 
(Easterlin  [1980]),  this  large  cohort  faced  tough  economic  conditions. 
Educational attainment ceased to improve for this cohort, and unemployment 
rates upon entering the job market were exceptionally high. Thus, the large 
homicide shift in Brazil is produced by a particularly large and socially fragile 
cohort.  
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The  state  of  São  Paulo  in  Brazil  has  received  a  significant  attention  in  the 
domestic and international media for its sharp swings in the 1990s and 2000s decades, 
which practically mimic the time-series patter in the US cities a decade early.
1 Violence 
increased steadily during the 1990s. In the São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA), the 
homicide rate jumped 54% in 1990s, from 28 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1992 to a peak 
of 43 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1999, when they started to fall sharply. In 




This phenomenon was widespread: a similar pattern arises if we consider only the 
city of São Paulo, the São Paulo Metropolitan Area excluding São Paulo and other large 
cities statewide (see De Mello and Schneider [2010]).  
                                                 
1 In the last four years The Economist reported twice on the murder trends in São Paulo (Protecting 
citizens from themselves, Oct 20

















































Source: DATASUS - National Ministry of Health
1992-2006
Fig. 1 Homicides Rates in São Paulo 
 
Again similar to the American case, candidates abound for explaining this major 
shift in violent crime (Zimiring (2007)). Improvements in enforcement occurred during 
the  period.  Among  them,  the  most  notable  was  the  adoption  of  a  unified  data  and 
intelligence system, INFOCRIM (a version of Compustat), although the timing and scope 
exclude  INFOCRIM  as  a first-order  explanation.
2  Incarcerated  population,  number  of 
police  officers  and  number  of  arrests  are  also  common  culprits.  Figure  2  shows  the 
number of arrests and policemen per 100,000 for the 2001-2006 period (for which we 
have data). Arrests and police, if anything, fell in the 2000s, suggesting reverse causality. 
Another candidate is incarceration. Figure 3 (borrowed from De Mello and Schneider 
[2010]) depicts the prison population per 100,000 inhabitants in the state of São Paulo 
from  1994  through  2006  (period  of  data  availability).  Incarceration  rates  rise 
monotonically, suggesting that for the period of the 1990s incarceration reacted to crime, 
and  not  contrary.  Thus,  it  cannot  explain  both  the  increase  and  the  reduction  in 
homicides.
3 
                                                 
2 Data from the Secretaria de Segurança do Estado de Sâo Paulo, the state-level enforcement authority, 
shows that INFOCRIM started in 2000 in the city of São Paulo, a full year after the 1999 reversal. Slowly, 
precinct by precinct, it was implemented in other cities within the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. Only in 
2005, implementation started outside the SPMA. 
3 Municipal level policies were also implemented. Among them a few are worth mentioning: the adoption 
“dry laws” (which are restrictions on the recreational sales of alcohol), the creation of municipal police 
forces, and the adoption of DISQUE-DENÚNCIA (an anonymous hotline to report crimes). Evidence in 
Biderman et al (2010) suggests dry laws had a 10% causal impact on homicides. Nevertheless, these 






























































































Panel B: Number of Policemen
Source : Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo
per 100thd inhabitants


































































Source: Secretaria da Administração Penitenciária do Estado de São Paulo
São Paulo: 1994-2006
Fig. 3 Incarceration Rates 
 
Finally,  gun  control  is  a  more  serious  candidate  for  explaining  the  aggregate 
trends. Starting in 1997 the state of São Paulo cracked down on the illegal possession of 
firearms, leading local analysts to attribute the sharp swings in homicides improvements 
in gun control (see The Economist 2005). Figure 4 depicts illegal firearm possession over 
the 1992-2005 period. 
     
 
 
The time-series pattern of reported illegal firearm possession seemingly matches 
the pattern of the homicide data. However, a few subtleties obscure causal interpretation. 
First,  there  is  the  issue  of  measurement.  Reported  illegal  firearm  possession  is  a 
combination  of  the  prevalence  of  firearms  in  the  population  (which  one  wishes  to 
observe) and police enforcement (which one wants to isolate). Consider the increase in 
illegal possession starting in 1997. This movement is in line with the anecdotal evidence 
that police cracked down on illegal gun possession (see Goertzel and Kahn [2007]). Thus, 
the  hike  in  late  1990s  less  is  not  due  to  an  increase  in  firearm  prevalence  but  to  a 
tightening in enforcement. Notwithstanding this fact, if one is prepared to assume away 






























































Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo
São Paulo: 1992-2005
Fig. 4 Illegal Firearm Possession Rates 
 
late 1990s was in fact an increase in prevalence, then one must also assume it was so in 
the  early  1990s.  But  then  it  becomes  hard  to  reconcile  the  movements  in  firearm 
prevalence and homicides. In summary, it does seem that movement in guns prevalence 
might have played a role in the reduction of violence in the 2000s but it explains neither 
the increase in violence in the 1990 nor the reversal in the late 1990s  
This paper argues that demographic changes play a crucial role in explaining the 
sharp shifts in violence. This assertion is supported using the following strategies. First, I 
show that the movements in homicides are not particular to the state of São Paulo. Much 
less  heralded  in  the  media,  but  equally  important,  the  country  as  whole  experienced 
similar shifts in homicide, albeit belatedly and somewhat less pronounced. We show that 
the trends in homicides are matched closely to the size of the population between 15 and 
24 years old, the most crime prone age. Changes in the size of the crime prone cohort 
explain  some  80%  of  the  time-series  variation  in  homicides  at  the  national  level. 
Competing explanations may rationalize the decline in homicides in 2000s (and most 
likely contributed to it), but are unable to explain the sharp in increase in homicides in 
1990s. Only demographic rationalizes both phenomena. 
In  addition  to  the  pure  time-series  evidence,  I  use  a  panel  of  Brazilian  states 
during the 1990s and the 2000s to recover a more credible causal effect of age-structure. 
With both time-series and cross-state variation, on can control for all aggregate shocks 
and for all time-invariant heterogeneity among states. The only variation left to estimate 
the impact of demography is how the age structure changed differently in different states. 
This is important for interpreting the estimated elasticity as causal because the period is 
ripe with aggregate shocks, such as monetary stabilization that enriched the poor and 
reduced income inequality, or a few nationwide policies such as the “Disarmament Law” 
(see footnote 4). In addition, long-term age-structure differences between states (cross-
section variation) could correlate with other demographics that affect violent behavior. 
Since most decisions that produce age-structure differences are made decades before, and 
because we control for state and year fixed-effects, I am quite confident that the variation 
in age structure used to estimate the homicide elasticity is exogenous, and thus we can  
 
interpret it as causal.
4 This is an additional advantage of a demographic explanation: most 
other variables that may affect violent behavior (police, guns, incarceration, etc…) are 
ripe with endogeneity problems, which prevents causal interpretation. In summary, our 
procedure is credible as it gets short of randomization of age structure, which is clearly 
impractical as a research design.  
I recover elasticities between 1.5 and 2.6 of homicides to changes with respect to 
changes in the 15-24 year-old population. Since demography has a common component 
across states (and year specific effects are included), it is not surprising that demography 
has smaller explanatory power with panel data. But it still explains a large share of the 
variation in homicides. Using these estimates for the elasticity, changes in the 15-24 year-
old population explain 60% of the nationwide variation in homicides.  
   The analysis goes one step further in terms of disaggregation. Borrowing from the 
analysis on De Mello and Schneider (2010), I use a panel of cities in the state of São 
Paulo  to  re-estimate  the  elasticity  of  homicides  to  changes  in  the  15-24  year-old 
population with another sample. The estimated elasticity is now stronger - 4 - but within 
the same range.  
Besides  documenting the  reduced form  impact  of  changes in  age  structure  on 
violent crime, I show the mechanism through which the demographic shift produced a 
crime-prone generation. During the 1970s, infant mortality declined abruptly as a result 
in basic health and sanitation condition. Fertility is endogenous and depends on infant 
mortality  rates,  but  only  belatedly  accelerated  its  rhythm  of  decline  (see  Soares  and 
Birchenall [2009]).
5 This drop in mortality, itself a sign of improvement in social welfare, 
had a side-effect. In rapidly urbanizing country such as Brazil, with a precarious supply 
of  public  services,  I  show  that  this  large  cohort  put  an  enormous  pressure  on  the 
educational system, deteriorating the rates of improvement in educational attainment. The 
Easterlin Hypothesis (Easterlin [1980]) that the size of the cohort affects its economic 
fortune seems operative. I show that, as the late 1970s cohort entered the job market, 
youth unemployment increased (above and beyond unemployment in general) and real 
                                                 
4 Migration may affect age structure contemporaneously. In section 7.D I show evidence that migration is 
not relevant enough empirically. Thus, it does not pose a serious threat to the identification strategy. 
5 Since Thompson’s original work (Thompson [1929]) demographers have known that the decline in 
fertility only belatedly follows the improvements in mortality.   
 
wages declined. In addition to their misfortune, members of late 1970s cohort faced a 
particularly bad job market for reasons other than demography: trade liberalization and 
technological change displaced unskilled labor in the short-run. Mutatis mutandis, labor 
market conditions improved in the 2000s. Thus, cohort size, and the attending fragility, 
played a major role in explaining both the spike in homicides during the 1990s and the 
decline in the 2000s.  
Received literature is ambiguous as to the impact of age structure on aggregate crime. 
Early work found strong association between demographics (including age structure) and 
the  rise  of  violence  in  the  US  during  the  1960s  and  1970s  (Chilton  and  Spielberger 
[1971],  Ferdinand  [1970],  Sagi  and  Wellford  [1968]).  Looking  a  longer  trends,  Fox 
(2000) shows that demographics match longer-term movements in homicides, but misses 
the sharp increase in violence in late 1980s. However, the author argues that current 
elasticity  estimates  suggest  that  demographic  changes  did  have  a  role  in  the  1990s 
decline, albeit a small one. Zimring (2007) finds that demography is the only factor broad 
enough to explain the geographical scope of the “great American crime decline” in the 
1990s. In contrast, Levitt (1999) finds only a small role for demography in explaining 
aggregate crime. See Marvel and Moody (1991) for a survey. Using elasticities normally 
recovered in the literature, it would be hard to explain quantitatively large shits in crime 
rates with changes in age structure. The literature normally interprets this fact as evidence 
of the limited role of demography (Levitt [1999], Zimiring [2007]). On the other hand, it 
is not uncommon for changes in demography to match movements in crime qualitatively 
(I show this for Brazil, and it is also true for the US except for the late 1980s spike in 
violent crime). I call this the “Demography Puzzle”. Illustrative of the puzzle, consider 
Zimiring’s, comment on the co-movement of long-term American and Canadian crime 
rates (Zimiring [2007]). He notes: 
 
“But what joint causes might have operated in Canada and the United 
States throughout the 1990s? This uncomfortably open question is of 
obvious importance to rethinking the causes of the U.S. decline…What 
would explain the 30% or so of slow and steady decline over the nine 
years  following  1991  in  the  United  States  and  Canada?  The  only  
 
traditional theory of decline supported by parallel U.S. and Canadian 
data trends is the decline of high-risk age groups as a percentage of 
the population. But even if all the decline in youth share of population 
that occurred both in 1980s and 1990s is counted toward the crime 
decline  that  was confined  to  the 1990s,  it would  be  difficult to  find 
many criminologists who would expect that feature alone to produce a 
crime decline greater than 10%, and even that 10% should have been 
spread  more  evenly  across  two  decades  in  both  countries.[But  the 
demographic similarity] between Canada and the United States over 
the  period  1980  onwards  invites,  if  it  does  not  demand,  a 
reconsideration of the magnitude of age structure effects on crime.”
 6 
   
  Perhaps  the  answer  to  the  “Demography  Puzzle”  rests  on  the  Easterlin 
Hypothesis. Decompositions in Levitt (1999) and Zimiring (2007) rest on the assumption 
that age-specific crime rates do not vary with group size. My results suggest that this 
procedure may understate the impact of changes age structure because the age-specific 
crime rates may vary with cohort size, at least with Brazilian data. With Brazilian data, 
age-group size does cause age-group crime rates.
7  
It  is  hard  to  overemphasize  the  importance  of  these  results.  According  to  the 
World Health Organization, in 2002 Brazil was the 11
th most violent country among its 
192 member, with a murder rate of 32.6 deaths per 100,000 (about six times the US 
rate).
8 Although it is hard to address age-structure issues with policy, shedding light on 
the underlying causes of violence in such  a violent environment is important per se. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that the returns to investing in reducing youth fragility 
go beyond gains to productivity. The impact on violence should be factored in when 
computing cost/benefit ratios.  
                                                 
6 My emphasis. 
7 Levitt (1999) does provide evidence to defend the decomposition keeping age-specific crime rates 
constant. I show in section 7 that with Brazilian data, the “constant age-specific rates” assumption is not 
warranted. 
8 The WHO figure for Brazil is 8% higher than the figure from the Brazilian National Ministry of Health, 
which is the source. Half of this difference may be explained by the fact the WHO uses the 2000 population 
from the census when computing its violent death rate. The author has no explanation for the other half.  
 
The paper has eight sections including this introduction. In section 2 contains an 
overview  of  the  socio-economic  trends  in  Brazil.  A  description  of  the  institutional 
background  on  law  enforcement  is  also  provided.  Section  3  describes  the  data  used. 
Section 4 provides a review of the literature on demography and crime. It also examines 
the plausibility of the age-structure hypothesis with Brazilian victim and perpetrator data. 
Section 5 provides the nationwide time-series evidence linking the size of the 15-24 year-
old group to aggregate homicides. Section 6 presents the panel evidence. One subsection 
contains state-level panel elasticity estimates. Another has the city-level panel evidence 
from the state of São Paulo. I use the estimated elasticities to show that changes in the 
size of the 15-24 age group explain between 60 and 80% of the aggregate movements in 
homicide in Brazil. Section 7 contains an in-depth discussion of the results. I start off by 
showing that the 15-24 year-old age-specific homicide rate increases with the size of this 
age group. Thus, decompositions based on “holding age-group homicide rates constant” 
are misleading with Brazilian data, which further justifies the idea of using elasticities 
estimated from panel-data regressions. Then I document several facts about the socio-
economic conditions of the late 1970s-early 1980s cohort. First, I show the reaons why 
this cohort was so large. Then I present ample evidence that this cohort is not only large 
but fragile, re-enforcing the crime-prone nature of the 1990s. Lastly, I show that, mutatis 
mutandis,  the  following  cohort,  besides  smaller,  faced  much  less  stringent  socio-
economic  conditions  (perhaps  helped  by  the  fact  that  it  was  smaller).  Section  8 
concludes. 
   
2. Socio-economic Trends and Institutional Background 
 
2.A Socio-Economic Trends 
 
Brazil is a large middle-income country. In 2006 the population was 187 million 
inhabitants with an income per capita of U$6,700 (in 2007 US dollars). After twenty 
years of military dictatorship, civil ruling returned in 1985 and the first president was 
elected  by  direct  ballot  in  1989.  The  1980s  and  1990s  were  a  traumatic  decades, 
economically and socially. After a decade of skyrocketing economic growth, the Latin  
 
American debt crisis hit the Brazilian economy in 1982, slowing growth throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s. Years of lax monetary policy culminated in cycles of super and 
hyper-inflation  followed  by  unsuccessful  stabilization  plans.  Finally,  the  1994 
stabilization plan, the first effective stabilization plan brought inflation under control, 
allowing the reorganization of the economy. Brazil also liberalized the economy in the 
1990s,  privatizing  many  state-owned  enterprises,  and opening  its  economy  to  foreign 
trade. The several panels in figure 5 depict the evolution of key socio-economic variables 
over the 1991-2006 period. 
   
 
 
Panel A shows the demographic transition from the 1980s through the mid 1990s. 
After the rapid acceleration in the late 1970s - early 1980s, population growth slowed 
considerably in the 1990s. As we will see below this movement in population is crucial 
for the interpretation of the demographic hypothesis advanced in this paper. Comparing 
panels A and B one sees that birth and death rates respond for almost all movements in 











































































































































% Unemployed in the SPMA
Panel F: Unemployment
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística e Geografia (IBGE) e Fundação SEADE
Fig. 5 Brazil: Macro Variables over the 1981-2007 period 
 
shows income per capita rather stagnant during the 1980s and 1990s. Economic growth 
picked up momentum after 2003, following the rapid acceleration of the world economy 
in  the  2004-mid  2008  period.  Income inequality fluctuated  around  high  levels  in  the 
1980s, increasing rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when inflation picked up 
momentum during.  With stabilization in 1994 inequality returned to the levels of the 
1980s; finally, since 2001 it has been declining steadily. Poverty follows a similar pattern 
(panel E). Finally, panel F depicts unemployment rates in the SPMA. Several structural 
shocks  hit  labor  markets  in  the  1990s,  most  notably  liberalization,  privatization  and 
technological changes that disfavored labor (Gonzaga et al (2006)). As a consequence, 
unemployment increased steadily during the 1990s, improving only in the mid 2000s. 
Among  15-to-24  year  olds  deterioration  of  labor  market  conditions  was  particularly 
strong, perhaps as a consequence of size of the cohort (seen section 7). 
  The story of figure 1 is compatible with the movements in aggregate crime rates 
during the 1990s and the 2000s. The rapid population growth in the late 1970s early 
1980s produced a large young cohort in the 1990s. Mutatis mutandis, population growth 
abated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, the large crime-age cohort in the 1990s 
was followed by a small crime-age cohort in the mid 2000s.  At the same time, economic 
conditions, especially in labor markets, which were generally unfavorable in the 1990s, 
improved considerably in 2000s. 
 
2.B Institutional Background 
 
  Brazil is a federal republic with three layers of government: federal, state and 
municipal.
9  The  main  bulk  of  law  enforcement  is  done  at  state-level.  Executive  and 
administrative authority rests with the state-level secretaries of security authorities (the 
Secretarias Estaduais de Segurança Pública), which respond directly the governor who 
allocates the budget to the secretary. The administrative and strategic decisions are done 
by  the  state  security  secretary,  which  is  appointed  by  the  governor.  Some  strategic 
decisions are determined by law. For example, by constitutional mandate, the number of 
policemen in the state of São Paulo has to be roughly constant in per capita terms across 
                                                 
9 President, governor and mayor are elected by direct ballot.  
 
cities. The execution of enforcement is shared between two corporations that respond to 
the secretary: the military police, responsible for patrolling and repression, and the civil 
police,  which  is  investigative.  The  commanders  of  the  two  police  forces  are  also 
appointed by the governor. Differently from the US, sheriffs are not elected but appointed 
among career officers. The institutional structure of state-level police is determined by 
the federal constitution.  
  The federal and municipal levels participate in law enforcement but to a much 
lower degree. The federal police force is rather similar to the American FBI, investigating 
mainly cross-state crime (mostly smuggling and drug trafficking), white-collar crimes 
and  corruption.  Differently  from  state-level  Secretarias,  municipal  police  forces 
(Guardas Municipais) are not mandatory by federal law but a choice of the municipality. 
In fact, in 2006 no more than 700 municipalities had a Guarda Municipal. In most cases 
Guardas  Municipais  do  mainly  the  enforcement  of  traffic  law,  and  the  majority  of 
Guardas Municipais do not carry firearms.
10 
  Since  the  main  bulk  of  enforcement  is  done  at  the  state-level,  nationwide 
articulated reactions to increase in homicides during the 1990s were rare (see figure 6 
below). The only noticeable exceptions are: 1) the creation of the National Force in 2004, 
a federal police force to be deployed in extreme circumstances, or if a member states 
request help; 2) the “Disarmament Law” in December 2003 (see footnote 4 above). 
 
3. Data  
 
We use several sources of data. State-level murder data come from DATASUS, 
the hospital database of the National Ministry of Health. Although the data go back quite 
a long time, the taxonomy of violent deaths changed in 1996.
11 For the state-level panel 
model we use data from 1996 onwards to keep consistency over time.
12 For depicting 
                                                 
10 There are exemptions. In the state of São Paulo, most Guarda Municipais carry firearms and are involved 
in community policing.  
11 From 1996 onwards, the system of morbidity taxonomy has been the 10
th International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-10), which substituted the previous system (the ICD-9). Differences in classification for 
deaths by external causes exist and the Brazilian ICD-9 and 10 series are not compatible with each other. 
More details can be found at the World Health Organization website at 
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ 
12 Elasticity estimates are similar if the series is extended back to 1991.  
 
national aggregates, when inconsistency is less costly, we use data from 1991. Also from 
DATASUS are data on the age distribution of homicide victims. 
The city-level homicide data for the state of São Paulo come from the Secretaria 
de  Segurança  Pública  de  São  Paulo  (SSP-SP),  the  state-level  enforcement  authority. 
Hospital data are available, but I prefer police report data the following reason. At the 
city  level,  geographical  location  of  hospital  murder  data  is  not  obvious.  The  murder 
victim may be taken to a hospital in another city. Hospital data systematically overstate 
the homicide rate in larger cities, and, worse still, the bias may be changing over time 
because more hospitals at constructed in smaller cities at the margin. Both facts suggest 
that police data are superior.  
Country-level  demographics  are  from  the  Instituto  Brasileiro  de  Estatística  e 
Geografia (IBGE), the Brazilian equivalent of the Bureau of Statistics. For census years 
(1991 and 2000) full population counts by age-groups are available. For non-census years 
in the 2000s, population by age-group is available from Pesquisa Nacional Amostral de 
Domicílios (PNAD), an annual household survey conducted by IBGE. The PNAD has a 
sample design but it is representative at the state level. For non-census years in the 1990s, 
and for all years at the city level, population by age-group is projected based on the 1991 
and 2000 census, and the population counts of 1996 and 2007.
13 For the state of São 
Paulo we use data from Fundação SEADE, the state-level think tank. Finally, data on the 
age distribution of perpetrators are from the Ministry of Justice. 
 
4. The Age-Structure - Violence Hypothesis: Literature and Patterns in 
Brazil 
 
4.1 A Brief Review of the Literature 
 
At  the  individual  level,  the  crime  -  age  nexus  is  one  of  the  most  robust 
relationships  in  all  social  sciences  (a  very  non-exhaustive  list  of  more  recent  work 
include Wilson and Herrnstein [1985], Blumstein [1995], and Cook and Laub [1998]). 
                                                 
13 Results are similar if for the 2000s use projections based on the 2000 census and the 2007 population 
count.  
 
Recent US victim and perpetrator data strongly suggest a link from age-structure 
to violence. In 1993, an 18-24 year-old American was roughly 50% more likely to be 
murdered  than  a  25-34  year-old,  the  second  highest  category,  with  the  difference 
increasing overtime (Fox [2000]; Rosenfeld [2000]). Furthermore, the 15-18 group has 
become increasingly relevant as victims of homicide (Fox [2000]).  
Besides being preferential victims, members of the 18-24 year-old age group are 
the  main  perpetrators.  At  the  height  of  the  American  crime  cycle  (late  1980s/early 
1990s), the 18-24 age group offending rate was more than 2.5 times that of the 25-34 
group (Fox [2000]). Interesting, the 25-34 group had higher victimization rate than the 
14-17 group, but the offending rate of the later was twice as large.  
Despite  the  individual  level  evidence, recent  literature  is  ambiguous  as  to the 
importance of changes in age structure to explain aggregate crime. Fox (2000) find that 
demography explains the major homicide trends from the mid 1960s through the mid 
1980s, but account neither for the increase in violence in late 1980s nor for the reduction 
in the early 1990s, perhaps because the two phenomena are one and the same.  Holding 
age-specific  murder  rates  constant,  Levitt  (1999)  finds  that  changes  in  age-structure 
explain less than 10% of the aggregate time-series variation over the 1960-1995 period. 
Zimiring  (2007)  examines  in  depth  all  the  explanations  for  what  he  calls  “the  great 
American crime decline”. He shows that demographic trends were favorable in 1990s. 
Similarly  to  Levitt  (1999),  Zimiring  shows  that,  holding  age-specific  homicide  rates 
constant  (either  ex-ante  or  ex-post),  changes  in  age  structure  cannot  account  for  the 
magnitude of the shift in homicides.  
The interpretation of the decomposition hinges crucially on the assumption that 
age-specific homicide rates do not change with the size of the age group. With Brazilian 
data, I find that the size of the 14-25 age group affects homicide rate for ages 15-24, 
which invalidate procedures such as Levitt’s (1999) (see section 7). Brazilian data seem 
to confirm Easterlin’s Hypothesis (Easterlin [1980]) that larger cohorts face increased 
difficulty entering the job market, which deteriorates the prospects of careers in the legal 
system. In this case, the age-group crime rates are themselves a function of the group 
size.  Section  7  contains:  1)  direct  evidence  that  age-group  victimization  rates  are  a  
 
function  of  population;  2)  and  evidence  on  the  mechanism  behind  this  fact,  i.e.,  a 
deterioration of socio-economic indicators for the late 1970s – early 1980s cohort. 
The issue of youth fragility and homicides has received considerable attention in 
the recent literature. Donohue and Levitt (2001) claim that the legalization of abortion in 
the early 1970s explains the shift in American homicides in the early 1990s. The specific 
claim is highly disputed (Rosenfeld [2004]; Joyce [2004]; Sorenson et al [2002]; Zimring 
[2007]). But the link between youth fragility and crime is plausible, and has support in 
the literature (see Zimiring (2007)). In a sense, this paper is bridge between the ideas of 
demography and fragility as explanations to violent crime. As argued by Zimring (2007), 
a large (small) 15-24 year population favors increases (reductions) violent crime. This 
effect, however, is compounded when youths are subject to unfavorable socio-economic 
conditions, as the Easterlin Hypothesis suggests. Furthermore, demographers suggest a 
quality-quantity trade-off in parental investment in offspring (Van Bavel [2006]). Thus, 
the very fact that a cohort is large reduces the quality of upbringing. These effects may be 
compounded  when  socio-economic  environment  is  already  fragile,  as  in  the  case  of 
Brazil in the 1990s. It would be surprising if a particularly large cohort had a significant 
impact on crime rates in highly developed European welfare states. 
 
4.2 Brazilian Victimization and Offense by Age Group 
 
  Brazilian  victimization  and  offending  data  follow  a  typical  pattern.  Figure  6 
shows the age distribution of homicide victims in two periods: 1996 through 2000 and 
2001 through 2006.  Persons aged between 15 and 24  years represent almost 40% of 
homicide victims. The second most victimized category is 25-34 with roughly 30% of 
victims. Overtime the 15 and 24 year-old group becomes slightly more important. If one 
uses data from the state-level secretaries of security, the 15-24 age group responds to a 
higher number of homicides, around 45% in 2005.
14  
 
                                                 




In Brazil, no times-series on offenders by age is available but the Ministry of 
Justice compiled one snapshot (see footnote 10 above).  From Jan-2004 through Dec-
2005, almost 50% of the all homicides in 2005 were committed by persons in the 15-24 
age group. In summary, victim and perpetrator data suggest that changes in demography 
could have a first-order impact on homicide rates.  
 
5. Aggregate time-series patterns 
 
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the story of the paper. Figure 7 shows the evolution of 
homicides  rates  in  São  Paulo  and  in  Brazil  excluding  São  Paulo.  Some  facts  arise. 
Homicides increased in the 1990s countrywide and in São Paulo. São Paulo reached a 
peak in 1999, four years earlier than in the rest of the country. Finally, the decline in São 
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Fig. 7 Homicides Rates per 100thd inhabitants: Brazil versus São Paulo
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The two panels in figure 8 depict the age distribution since 1990 for Brazil and 
São Paulo.
  Mimicking the homicide trends, the size of the 15-24 year-old age group 
increased monotonically in the 1990s and then reached a peak. Similarly to homicides, 
São Paulo reached peak five years before the rest of the country. Although suggestive, the 
time-series  correlation  may  be  spurious.  Table  1  sheds  light  on  the  interpretation  of 
figures 7 and 8.
15 I estimate several regressions of homicides on the size of the 15-24 
year-old population to check whether the pattern in Figures 7 and 8 survive some simple 





                                                 
15 Figure 7 shows homicides up to 2006. In the regression we include the 2007 figure. The discrepancy is 
due to the availability of homicide data at the state level for the year 2007. 
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Source: Instituto Brasileirode Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) 
 
TABLE 1: Brazil over 1992-2007 period          
Dependent Variable: Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
B  (5)
B 
15-24 year-old population (in millions) 
1.18  3.32  1.87  2.89  2.35 
(0.30)
***  (0.56)




Population  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Polynomial of Year?
A  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  16  16  16  16  16 
R
2  0.53  0.82  0.94  0.87  0.96 
All standard errors are Newey-West corrected for heteroskedastic and first-order autocorrelation. 
***: significant at the 1% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
*: significant at the 10% level                
A: Year, Year
2 and Log(Year) 
B: Log-in-Logs model. Dependent variable is Log(Homicide Rate). Regressors are Log(Population 15-24) and 
Log(Population) 
Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) 
 
In column (1), I regress homicide rates on the population in the 15-24 year-old 
group. The (very precisely estimated) coefficient 1.18 means that a one million increase 
in the 15-24 year-old population is associated with an increase of 1.18 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants. Figure 8 shows that the 15-to-24 population in Brazil excluding São 
Paulo increase by 4.7 million between 1992 and the peak in 2005.   Multiplying 4.7 by 
the  1.18,  the  estimated  coefficient,  the  model  in  column  (1)  predicts  an  increase  of 
roughly  5.5  homicides  per  100,000  inhabitants.  The  actual  increase  was  about  9 
homicides  per  100,000  inhabitants.  For  the  drop  in  homicides  from  2005  onwards  a 
similar prediction arises. Thus, the size of the 15-24 year-old population alone explains 
50% of the variation in murder rates. Other factors are not constant over time, most 
notably population itself. The model in column (2) includes population as a control. The 
impact  of  the  15-24  population  is  now  much  stronger.  In  fact,  the  model now  over-
predicts the increase in homicides by 6 (15 against 9), but under-predicts the reduction (2 
against the actual 3.4).  
Visual inspection of figures 7 and 8 suggest that the population and homicide 
series  are  non-stationary.  We  do  not  dwell  into  the  complications  of  evaluating  co-
integration between series using 16 observations. We do however include a polynomial 
of time to see whether movements in the 15-24 year-old population are still associated  
 
with  changes  homicides.  The  coefficient  is  again  very  significant  statistically  and  in 
practice. It predicts the increase in homicides accurately (8.8 against 9.1). For robustness 
(and for later comparison) we estimate a log-in-logs model, which produces coefficients 
that  are  interpretable  as  elasticities.  Column  (4)  is  equivalent  to  column  (1).  The 
estimated elasticity is high, 2.89, and very significant statistically. Over the 1992-2005 
period, the  15-to-24  year-old population  increase  by  20%.  Multiplying  this  figure  by 
2.89,  the  model  predicts  a  59%  increase  in  homicides,  closely  replicating  the  actual 
increase (17 to 27.3 per 100,000 inhabitants).
16 Finally, column (5) has the estimates of a 
log-in-logs model equivalent to column (3), with similar results. In summary, the size of 
the 15-24 year-old population explains a significant proportion of the aggregate time-
series  variation  in  homicides.  In  addition,  the  time-series  relation  between  these  two 
variables is as robust as it can be with no more than 16 observations.  
 
 
6. Panel Evidence 
 
6.A State-Level Regressions 
 
  Identification  of  causal  effects  with  pure  time-series  variation  is  challenging, 
especially with such a reduced number of observations. An alternative is panel data and 
explore how demography varied differently over time and across cross-section unit. In 
this subsection the cross-section unit is states; next section it is cities. As we shall see, 
panel and aggregate evidence are complements in identifying the impact of demography 
on violent crime, and produce remarkably similar results. 
Demography and crime are not randomly determined but choices of the agents. 
Consequently, their relationship may suffer from the usual problems: reverse causality 
and omission of common determinants.  
Demography  has  two  pillars.  One  is  fertility  and  mortality,  which  largely 
produced  by  decision  made  several  years  -  if  not  decades  -  before.  The  second  is 
                                                 
16 The elasticity approximation to percentage increases is valid locally, for small changes in the regressors. 
Thus, the 59% effect should be viewed as a coarse approximation.  
 
migration,  a  short  medium-term  decision.  Regarding  the  first  channel  –  fertility  and 
mortality – it is unlikely that demography and crime have a common cause because crime 
is contemporaneous decision. Of course, fertility and mortality decisions made several 
years before may have been influenced by some hard-to-measure factor that is persistent 
over time, e.g. quality of institutional framework, and also determines crime. However, 
persistence is, by definition, somewhat constant overtime, and thus can be accounted for 
by the inclusion of state-fixed effects.  
Migration is a potential stumbling block. Inflows to and outflows from abroad are 
just not relevant in Brazil during the period. Internal migration movements cancel out 
within the country. Thus, if unobserved time-varying heterogeneity across states caused 
by migration drives panel results, then pure time-series aggregate estimates should show 
no effect of demography on aggregate crime, which is not the case. Nevertheless, it is 
plausible  that  high-growth  states  attract  both  criminals  and  15-24  year-old  migrants, 
causing omitted variable bias (although we do control for income using GDP per capita). 
Migration may also produce reverse causality: violence may induce emigration. It should 
be noted that migration threatens identification of the causal impact of age structure only 
if it changes age distribution in the population. For example, if older people are more 
prone to emigrate due to violence, then our procedure would capture reverse causality. In 
the end, whether migration challenges the causal interpretation is an empirical question. 
In section 7.D, we measure the importance of migration in Brazil to show that it is not a 
sufficiently relevant phenomenon to pose a serious threat to our identification strategy. 
Let i be a state and t be a year. The estimated model is: 
 
                          














1 0 1524 log log
e t
b b
                    (1) 
 
Homicides is the number of homicide per 100thd inhabitants, 1524 is the 15-24 
year-old population. TIMEt is a full set of year dummies, and STATEi is a full set of state 
dummies. Controls include the log of population, the log of the Gini coefficient, the log 
of  the  GDP  per  capita  and  the  log  of  illiteracy  rate  and  15-24  year-olds.  Population  
 
captures migration movements, the component of demography that is a product of current 
choices  of  agents.  Economic  activity,  captured  by  GDP  per  capita,  may  have  varied 
differently across states in the sample period. Education is a state-level attribution in 
Brazil, and the vulnerability of youngsters, measure by their illiteracy rates, varies across 
states. Finally, when estimating the parameters in (1) we weight observations by the state 
population for two reasons. First, homicide is notoriously noisy in small populations. 
Second,  by  weighting  by  population  we  emulate  an  elasticity  representative  of  the 
country using state-level observations. 
With a panel structure, one can discard all pure time-series variation (and all pure 
cross-city variation), leaving only demography changed differently in different states as a 
source of identifying variaton. Several more layers of coincidence are now necessary to 
produce  the  results  spuriously.  Second,  we  can  account  for  all  time-invariant 
heterogeneity among cities, which helps identifying the effect of demography.  Figure 9 


















                                                 
17 I do not depict all 27 states for conciseness.   
 










































































Homicides per 100thd inhabitants
15-24 Population







































































Homicides per 100thd inhabitants
15-24 Population














































































































































Homicides per 100thd inhabitants
15-24 Population




































































































































































































































































































Homicides per 100thd inhabitants
15-24 Population
Panel H: Goiás 
 
Figure 9 illustrates graphically the type of variation explored when estimating 
equation (1). In a couple of cases - Ceará and Goiás - the 15-24 year-old population 
increases monotonically and so do homicide rates. Even more interesting are two cases in 
which the 15-24 year-old population increases and then decreases: Rio de Janeiro and 
Minas Gerais. In all cases, homicides tend to mimic the behavior of the 15-24 year-old 
population (in Minas Gerais the 15-24 year-old population reaches a peak later than Rio 
de Janeiro, and so do homicide rates). Another interesting case is Pernambuco. The 15-24 
year-old population and homicides increase until the early 2000s. Differently from Rio de 
Janeiro  and  Minas  Gerais,  the  15-24  year-old  population  fluctuates  around  this  peak 
afterwards.  Correspondingly,  homicide  rates  stabilized  at  a  high  level.  In  Bahia  and 
Paraná  homicides  and  the  15-24  year-old  population  also  show  co-movement  in  the 
1990s, but in both cases, although the 15-24 year-old population stabilized in the 2000s, 
homicides have not abated yet. 
More importantly than co-movement between the two series, figure 9 shows that 
demography evolved differently in different states, which provides valuable variation to 
estimate  the  parameters  in  equation  (1).  The  fact  that  homicide  rates  also  varied 
differently in different states, in  general mimicking demography, is suggestive of the 
causal relationship between demography and homicides in Brazil. When one estimates 
equation  (1),  one  assess  whether  this  relationship  survives  controlling  for  aggregate 
effects (year effects), state fixed effects, and for four time-varying covariates (population, 
GDP per capita, income inequality and illiteracy within the 15-24 year-old population. 











TABLE 2: States of Brazil over the 1996-2006 period       
Dependent Variable: Log of Homicide Rate per 100thd inhabitants 
   (1)  (2)  (3)













D  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
# Observations  297  297  403  297  297  297 
R
2  0.84  0.86  0.88  0.84  0.86  0.86 
All standard errors are White-Huber heteroskedastic corrected, unless otherwise noted. All models include state 
dummies and the log of state population. In all models observations are weighted by population. 
***: significant at the 1% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
*: significant at the 10% level                   
A: Sample period is 1992-2006                   
B: Estimated standard errors corrected for within year correlation (clustered at the state level) 
C: Estimated standard errors corrected for within panel correlation (clustered at the year level) 
D: Covariates are the log of state GDP per capita, the log of the percentage of illiterate 15-24 year-olds, and the log of the state-level 
Gini Coefficient 
Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) 
 
 
  All  estimated  models  include  state  dummies  and  the  log  of  population.  The 
dependent  variable  is  the  rate  of  homicides  per  100,000  inhabitants.  Thus,  the 
relationship between the size of the 15-24 population and the homicides is not driven by a 
mechanic size effect. In column (1) I include year dummies but not the covariates. It 
should be noted that the inclusion of year dummies deals with all concerns about whether 
the series are stationary. A 1% increase in the 15-24 population causes a 2.58% increase 
in the murder rate. Controlling for covariates reduces the impact slightly, but it is still 
quite significant both statistically and practically (column (2)). In column (3) we extend 
the sample period back to 1992. Despite the different criteria for homicide classification 
(see section 3), extending the sample serves two purposes. First, it provides yet another 
robustness check. Second, and more importantly, it allows for a comparison with the 
pure-time  series  estimates  in  table  1.  Again,  the  impact  of  the  size  of  the  15-24 
population  is  significant  both  statistically  and  practically.  In  addition,  the  impact  is 
remarkable  is  similar  to  the  one  in  table  1.  In  columns  (4)  and  (5)  we  check  the 
robustness of the estimated standard errors to within panel autocorrelation and across  
 
panel correlation, something important with panel data. Estimated standard errors are 
slightly larger when one corrects for within panel autocorrelation, but results stand. 
An estimated elasticity over 1 suggests that, in levels, homicide rates are a convex 
function of the size of the 15-24 year-old population. I estimate model (1) in levels and 
use  the  estimated  coefficients  the  size  of  the  15-24  year-old  population  to  predict 
homicide rates. Figure 10 shows the results (the estimate coefficient on the linear and 




As expected, homicide in levels is a convex function of the size of the 15-24 year-
old  population.  Predicted  homicide  rates  matches  quite  well  the  variation  in  actual 
homicides: between 1996 and 2003, actual homicides increase by almost 20 percent, and 
so does predicted homicides. The predicted reduction is less acute than the actual drop, 
perhaps reflecting the fact that the predicted peak is couple of years later than the actual 
peak. Including the year 2007 in the predict series suggest that the predicted reduction is 







































Fig. 10 Predicted versus Actual Homicide Victims
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6.B City-Level Regressions (São Paulo State) 
 
This section goes one step further into disaggregation. I estimate the elasticity of 
homicides with respect to the size of the 15-24 year-old population using a panel of cities 
in the state of São Paulo. The reason to use cities in São Paulo is data availability, as 
explained in section 3.  
The estimated model is similar to  equation (1), except that we have no time-
varying control except population itself. The sample period is 1997-2006 because crime 
data is available for all cities in São Paulo starting only in 1997. Due to the large number 
of  cross-section  observations  we  first-difference  the  data  instead  of  including  city 
dummies.
18 In the case of city-level regressions weighting the observations by population 
is even more important than when state-level data are used. Homicide rates are very noisy 
in small cities. Results are in table 3. 
 
TABLE 3: All Cities in São Paulo State, 1997-2006 period 
Dependent Variable: ∆Log of Homicide Rate per 100thd inhabitants 
   (1)  (2)
 A  (3)
B 
∆Log(1524) 






0.55  0.55  0.55 
(0.23)
**  (0.34)  (0.33) 
# Obs  2108  2108  2108 
R
2  0.25  0.25  0.25 
All standard errors are White-Huber heteroskedastic corrected, unless otherwise 
noted. All models include time dummies in levels. In all models observations are 
weighted by population. 
***: significant at the 1% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
*: significant at the 10% level 
A: Estimated standard errors corrected for within year correlation (clustered at the state level) 
B: Estimated standard errors corrected for within panel correlation (clustered at the year level) 
Source: IPEADATA and Secretaria de Segurança do Estado de São Paulo. 
 
   
                                                 
18 The procedures are similar. In some cases they are algebraically the same. See Woodridge (2000).  
 
Estimated elasticities are now even stronger than state-level’s ones, about twice 
the magnitude. Estimated standard errors are no longer sensitive to accounting for within 
and across panel correlation among observations. City-level estimates again confirm the 




7.A Cohort Size and Cohort Violence 
 
One major stumbling block with the demographic explanation of violent crime is 
the fact that age-structure changes slowly but homicides may shift vary sharply over a 
relatively short period of time, as it is the case in the US and in Brazil. In other words, 
even if changes in the age structure match shift in crime qualitatively, they come short of 
explaining magnitudes (Zimiring [2007]). In fact, a standard procedure in the literature is 
to perform a Oxaca-Blinder type of decomposition to find the impact of demography on 
aggregate  type  (Kitagawa  [1964],  Steffensmeier  and  Harer  [1987],  Levitt  [1999]). 
Holding baseline homicide rates constant, one computes predicted aggregate homicide 
rates for subsequent years by multiplying the baseline age-specific homicides rates by the 
proportion  of  people  in  those  age  categories  in  that  year.  Levitt  (1999)  uses  this 
procedure and finds a small impact of the changing age structure on aggregate crime. 
Using data from cities in the state of São Paulo, De Mello and Schneider (2010) find that 
simulated homicide rates match the timing of the reversal of the actual homicide trend 
very well, but fail to account for levels. 
The validity of these decomposition hinges on a crucial assumption: age-specific 
homicide  rates  are  not  a  function  age-group  size.  Levitt  (1999)  presents  regression 
evidence supporting the validity of this assumption for US data. With Brazilian data, we 
find strong evidence that this assumption is violated.  
Figure 11 clearly shows that most, if not all, movement in homicides rate came 
from the 15-24 year-old age group, at least insofar as victimization is concerned. Thus, as 
James Alan Fox (1999) puts, the explanation is driven by the 15-24 year-old group, either 




Figure 11 also suggests a non-linear relationship between the size of the 15-24 
age group and the group specific homicide rates. To confirm this non-linear relationship, 
I estimate several versions of the following model: 
 









it i i t t it
it it it
STATE S TIME Controls
1 1
2 1 0 Population   Total log 1524   Population log 524 Homicides1 log
e t
b b b
    (2) 
 
where i is a state and t is a year. Definitions of TIMEt, STATEi and Controlsit are as 
defined in (1). Observations are again weighted by the state population. An estimated β1 
is more than 1 means that the homicides within the 15-24 year-old group increases by 
more than the population, implying that the age-specific homicide rate is increasing in 
age  group  population,  violating  the  assumption  that  age-specific  homicide  rates  are 




















































All ages but 15-24
Victimization Rates
Fig. 11 Homicide by Age Group 
 
that  β1  does  not  capture  a  scale  effect  or  other  spurious  time-series  effects.  Table  4 
presents the results. 
 
TABLE 4: States of Brazil, 1996-2006 period 
Dependent Variable: Log of Homicide Victims in the 15-24 year-old group    




Log(15-24 year-old population) 




**  (1.58)  (0.28) 
Covariates?
D  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
# Observations  297  297  297  297  297 
R
2  0.91  0.96  0.84  0.96  0.97 
All standard errors are White-Huber heteroskedastic corrected, unless otherwise noted. All models 
include state and year dummies, and the log of the state population, unless otherwise noted. In all 
models observations are weighted by population. 
***: significant at the 1% level    
**: significant at the 5% level    
*: significant at the 10% level                
A: Dependent variable is the log of the 15-24 age-group homicide rate (homicides per 100,000thd inhabitants). 
Regressor is the log of percentage of 15-24 year-olds in the state population. Log of state population not 
included. 
B: Estimated standard errors corrected for within year correlation (clustered at the state level) 
C: Dependent variable is the log of homicides in all ages except 15-24.Regressor is the log of population in all 
ages except 15-24. 
D: Covariates are the log of state GDP per capita, the log of the percentage of illiterate 15-24 year-olds, and the 
log of the state-level Gini Coefficient 
Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) 
 
Column (1) has a stripped-down model, with no controls included. The estimated 
coefficient 2.82 means that a 1% increase in the size of the 15-24 year-old population 
causes  an  increase  of  2.81%  in  total  homicide  within  15-24  year-olds.  Thus  the 
relationship is convex, not linear. In column 2 controls are included. Although the non-
linearity is less severe, it is still quite significant, both statistically and practically. In 
column (3) the non-linear hypothesis tested in a different way. Instead of including the 
log  of  population  as  a  regressor,  I  use  the  log  of  the  homicide  rate  as  a  dependent 
variable. The coefficient 1.77 means that a 1% increase in the 15-24 year-old population 
increases the 15-24 year-old homicide rate by 1.77%. Notice that any estimated positive 
(not only above 1) would suggest that homicide rates increase with the size of population. 
In column (4) observations are clustered at the state-level; some precision is lost but the  
 
coefficient  is  still  marginally  significant  (at  14%  level).  Finally,  in  column  (5),  the 
dependent  variable  is  replaced  by  homicides  in  all  age  groups  except  15-24  and  the 
regressor is replaced by total population except 15-24 year-olds. The convex relationship 
between size of population and homicide is only valid for the 15-24 age group.  
  What are the theoretical mechanisms behind the age-group size – age-group crime 
rate nexus? At the family level, parents face a quality-quantity trade-off in offspring: 
larger families invest less (per capita) in their offspring, reducing human capital and thus 
lifetime earnings and social mobility (see Van Bavel [2006] for empirical on the quality-
quantity trade-off evidence during a demographic transition similar to Brazil’s). At the 
aggregate level, the Easterlin Hypothesis (Easterlin [1980]) states that larger cohorts face 
increased difficulty entering the job market, which deteriorates the prospects of careers in 
the legal system. In the next subsections we show not only that the late 1970s-early 1980s 
cohort  faced  tough  conditions  in  the  job  market,  but  also  faced  difficulty  in  the 
educational system.  
   
7.B What Caused the Especially Large Late 1970s Cohort?  
 
An important underlying question is what caused the large cohort born in the 
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Fig. 12a Infant Mortality versus Birth Rates: levels
Infant Mortality Birth Rate
Source: InstitutoBrasileiro de Estatística e Geografia. Infant mortality is the number of deaths of infants less than a year old per 1000 births during a 
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Fig. 12b Infant Mortality versus Birth Rates: % changes
Infant Mortality Birth Rate
Source: InstitutoBrasileiro de Estatística e Geografia. Infant mortality is the number of deaths of infants less than a year old per 1000 births during a 
year.The birth rate is the number of born-alive infants per 1000 inhabitants during a year. 
 
From 1940 through 1970, infant mortality dropped steadily, but birth rates stayed 
roughly constant, with slight acceleration in reduction between 1960 and 1970. This well-
known pattern among demographers is not specific to Brazil, and explains exponential 
growth of the Brazilian population after 1940. After 1980, while the pace of reduction in 
infant mortality abated, reductions in fertility accelerated. This pattern is well-known to 
demographers (Galor [2005]). In the first phase of the demographic transition, factors 
such as vaccination, improvement in basic health services, and increases in food supply 
reduce mortality rapidly. Fertility rates respond only with lag, as households readjust to 
return to the optimal number of offspring. 
Until the late 1970s, the Brazilian age distribution was a pyramid, with a large 
base  and  thin  top.  By  the  mid  1990s,  one  can  see  the  impact  of  the  movements  in 
mortality and fertility rates. The shape changes (figure 13). Not only the late 1970s cohort 
is particularly large but the subsequent cohort is relatively small. This is the demographic 
bonus: a large cohort followed by a small one. 
 
7.C The Socio-Economic Consequences of the 1970-1980 Cohort  
 
The demographic bonus is normally beneficial, reducing the dependency ratio, 
improving economic growth and social security accounts (see Turra and Queiroz (2006)). 
While for the economy as a whole the demographic bonus might be beneficial, those born 
in the large cohort will usually face economic difficulty. Easterlin (1980) has outlined the 
theoretical mechanism, and showed empirical Evidence for the United States. When a 
large  cohort  reaches  the  job  market,  both  the  number  of  workers  increases.  This  is 
outward shift in the supply of labor, which could increase unemployment in the short run 
(under  sticky  prices)  and/or  reduce  real  wages.  If  young  workers  are  not  perfect 
substitutes  for  workers  in  general,  an  additional  effect  to  the  same  direction  happen 
because the relative because the relative number of young workers increase as a large 
cohort enters the job market. The same argument can be made for the educational system: 
a large cohort, especially in a rapidly urbanizing country like Brazil in the 1970s and 
1980s,  puts  pressure  on  the  educational  system,  further  deteriorating  its  economic  
 
fortunes. In this subsection, I document both facts using national-level data and data from 
the State of São Paulo. 
 
7.C.1 Country Level 
 
Besides  producing  a  large  cohort,  the  late  1970s  saw  the  last  period  of  rapid 
urbanization (see figure 14). We now argue that this large cohort put pressure on the 














Fig. 14 Percentage of Urban Population




Despite the difficulties in documenting the pressure on public services, some data 
are available. Figure 15 depicts changes in illiteracy rates among 15-17 year olds, and 
conveys the following pattern. The 1980s saw a reduction in the speed in which illiteracy 
rates were dropping. The lowest rate of change occurs in 1990, when illiteracy actually 
increased over the previous year. The reduction in the pace of improvement is not due to 
diminishing  returns  to  investment  in  education.  By  the  mid-1990s  the  illiteracy  rate 
started  to  decline  at  increasing  rates  again.  In  fact,  the  best  in  year  in  terms  of 
improvement in illiteracy rates was 1999. 
Moving back 16 years from the early 1990s puts us in the mid 1970s, when the 
first members from the late 1970s-early 1980s cohort were born. In the mid 1990s the 
pace  of  improvement  increased  again,  which  is  compatible  with  a  smaller  cohort 
following the late 1970s cohort.
19  
                                                 
19 If in 1985 the policy makers were completely forward looking agents that maximized inter-generational 
utility they should have anticipated the demographic bonus and borrowed against the future demographic 
dividend of the of late 1970s cohort to finance its education. This hypothesis requires not only tremendous 
farsightedness on politicians but also an amount of collective inter-generational benevolence that is not 








Fig. 15 Changes in illiteracy rates among 15-17 year-olders
Yearly Change in Illiteracy Rate
6-degrees Polynomial Fit
Source: InstitutoBrasileiro de Estatìstica e Geografia.   
 
In  summary,  aggregate  evidence  suggests  that  a  particularly  large  cohort  put 
pressure on urban public services (i.e., public schooling) in a still rapidly urbanizing 
country. The late 1970s cohort was large and fragile. Fertility rates then dropped, and the 
subsequent  cohort  was  much smaller.  The quantity-quality  trade-off  faced  by  parents 
further  exacerbates  the  differences  between  the  1990s  and  2000s  cohorts:  parental 
investment  in  human capital  was  probably  larger  for the  later  cohort,  which reduced 
fragility (Van Bavel [2006]). 
 
7.C.1 São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA) 
 
Using  data  available  for  the  SPMA,  we  can  further  investigation  on  the 
consequences of the large cohort. Figure 16 shows unemployment rates for the whole 
population and for the 18-24 age group. 
 
   
 
Several facts emerge from fig. 16. Panel A shows that unemployment rates within 



























































Panel B: Base 100
Source: DIEESE and Fundação SEADE
Overall versus aged 18-24
Fig. 16: Unemployment rates in the SPMA 
 
the difference oscillates between 31 and 66 percent. After oscillating in the late 1980s, 
unemployment rates increased sharply and unabatedly during the 1990s. In panel B we 
see that, apart from the difference in levels, the series move very closely together in the 
1980s.  Starting  in  1993,  when  the  first  members  of  1975-1980  cohort  turned  18, 
unemployment  18-24  age  group  start  to  rise  faster  than  overall  unemployment.  The 
difference gains momentum in late 1990s. From then onwards, unemployment in general 
starts to abate.
20 
Wages in the legal sector are perhaps even more important than unemployment 
(Grogger [2000]).
21 Figure 17 shows average wages for the two crime-prone age groups: 
15-to-17 and 18-to-24 year olds. 
 
 
Source: Fundação SEADE 
 
                                                 
20 Overall unemployment rates rose for unrelated reasons. The literature concludes than technological 
shocks favoring capital, skilled labor combined with trade liberalization, and lukewarm growth caused the 
spike in unemployment during the 1990s. See Gonzaga et al (2006).  
21 It is more natural to think that lower economic opportunity costs will increase property crimes. Insofar as 















Figures 17 is the price mirror imagine of quantities in figure 16. Through the mid 
1990s onwards, real wages for the crime-prone age groups drop steadily until 2003, when 
they stabilize, and then start rising again. Crime rates started to drop somewhat earlier 
(circa 2000). Nevertheless, dropping wages in the late 1990s again confirm the harsh jorb 
market conditions for young worker in the 1990s. 




Source: Fundação SEADE. 
 
Children in primary school are aged between 6 and 14 years. We do not observe 
their average age, but drop-out rates for grades 5
th though 8
th are roughly three times as 
high as those for 1
st through 4
th. Thus, eleven is a reasonable guess for the average age of 
a primary school drop-out. The primary-school drop-out rate reached a peak in 1989, 
twelve years after 1978. In São Paulo, the large cohort was born between 1976 and 1980. 
                                                 
22 We choose primary school rates instead of high-school rates for the following reason. Enrollment for 
primary school enrollment has been virtually universal in the SPMA. Thus, selection into enrolling does not 


















































































































Fig. 17: Primary school drop-out rate
São Paulo Metropolitan Area 
 
After 1990, drop-out rates start to drop; at first slowly, then quite sharply in second half 
of the 1990s, when the large cohort was between 16 and 20 years old and, thus, at least 
five years over the average primary school age.  
In summary, data from the SPMA again suggest that the Easterlin Hypothesis is 
valid with Brazilian data. The late 1970s cohort was large and socially fragile. Not only 
they had worse performance in terms of educational attainment, but they faced very tough 
job market conditions. An unfortunate coincidence, general unemployment rose sharply 
as this fragile cohort was entering the job market.  
 
7.D Are Differences in Age-Structure Across States Exogenous? 
 
The use of non-experimental data calls for careful consideration of identification 
issues. Two problems may arise: omitted factors, and reverse causality. 
Reverse causation could still arise for a mechanical reason. Homicide victims are 
concentrated in the male age bracket 15-24. Thus an increase in homicides reduces the 
relative number of 15-24 males. But murders are too few to make a significant difference. 
For an illustration, at its 2003 peak, there were 19,731 homicides in Brazil whose victims 
were 15-to-24-year-olds. Although the number is certainly very high, it amounts to no 
more  than  0.05%  of  all  15-to-24-year-olds.  In  any  event,  this  mechanical  reverse 
causality force would bias results towards zero.  
The  age-structure  in  the  1990s-2000s  is  a  product  of  three  factors:  1)  past 
reproductive decisions and mortality rates; 2) migration.  
Reproductive decisions tend  to  be  exogenous  because they  were  take  decades 
prior to crime decision. Arguably, theorize that decisions in the past will cause other 
differences across states twenty years down the road. Nevertheless, state (and city) fixed-
effects  are  included  in  the  regression.  Thus,  most  structural  differences  across  states 
(cities) that could be the result of decision made in previous decades are accounted for. In 
summary, omitted variable due to reproductive decision, although possible, is far-fetched. 
Migration poses a more serious threat, but we can assess whether it is relevant 
empirically. Internal migration is just not very relevant. Data from 1991 and the 2000 
censuses show that only 5% of the population on the 15-24 age group was composed of  
 
migrants who had been leaving outside their home states for 5 years or less. In addition, 
movements in migration have a trivial impact on the size of the 15-24 age group. Below, 
I show the results of a regression of the first-difference in 15-24 year-old population size 
on the difference in stock of migrants aged between 15 and 24 years that had been living 
outside the home state for five years or less. More precisely, the estimated equation is: 
  
Δ1524   = −12.71
  .    ΔMigration1524   
        Number of Observations = 27,    = 0.002   
 
where t = 1991 and 2000. The impact of migration is negative but in practice it is zero 
(12 is a very small number compared with the average state population in 15-24 year-old 
(163,000)). Since migration has no significant impact on the size of the 15-24 year-old 




In this paper I show the crucial role of demography in explaining violent crime.. I 
recover a large age structure elasticity of homicides to the size of the 15-24 age group. 
This is a reduced-form object because it captures both the sheer effect of cohort size but 
also indirect effect that a large cohort has on age-specific crime rates. I also document a 
deterioration of socio-economic prospects for the late 1970s – early 1908s, especially in 
terms  of  job  market  prospects.  This  deterioration  is  in  accordance  with  the  Easterlin 
Hypothesis (Easterlin [1980]). Quite unfortunate, the large cohort also entered the job 
market in a period of high unemployment due to trade liberalization and technological 
changes that economized on unskilled labor. The Easterlin Hypothesis, corroborated with 
Brazilian data, suggest that age-specific crime rates are a function of age-group size, 
which rationalizes the large reduced-form elasticities I recover. My results shed light on 
the “Demography Puzzle”: when age-specific crime rates vary with age-group size, then 
decompositions understate the true impact of demography.  
 
Concerning  policy  implications,  results  in  this  paper  are  seemingly  dismal. 
Demography is not a choice variable. However, age structure is one of the very few 
socio-economic variables that can be forecast with precision. Thus, policy-makers can 
anticipate crime  prone  circumstances,  and  invest ahead  in  reducing  youth  fragility  in 
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